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•STATE OP ,NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD ^ 
#2A-5/2 3/74 
In the Matter of 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, :' BOARD DECISION 
- and'- : AND ORDER 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, : 
:, -_,__ _.._ __;^  ^ . • . _ CASE No. U-0975^ 
-. — : CnaFiglng-PSFtyT : '~ : :—-—';— ~~— 
On March 11, 1974, a hearing officer issued his decision 
dismissing the charge in this matter because it was not timely. 
It now comes- to us on exceptions filed by the Susquehanna Valley 
Teachers' Association (association) to this decision. 
The association, filed the charge on September,17, 1973, 
alleging that the Susquehanna Valley Central School District 
(school district) had violated CSL §§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) when, 
on August 2, 1973, it issued a "legislative determination" in 
resolution of a negotiations impasse that, according- to the 
association, was not appropriate for such a legislative deter-
mination. -, -.•'.. 
In a contract executed on April 4, 1973, which covered 
the period from July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1974, the parties, 
agreed upon a gross dollar amount for 1973-74 salaries but 
established a procedure by which an alternative salary plan for 
1973^74 might be achieved. This procedure called for the appoint-
ment of a joint committee to make recommendations and further 
provided that, in the event that the recommendations were rejected, 
the-matter of the alternative salary plan — but not the gross 
dollar amount — would "...become subject to negotiations under 
the Taylor Law." Because of a dispute regarding the composition 
of the committee, it never became functional and the parties 
proceeded to negotiate. These negotiations did not yield an 
agreement and on April 30, 1973,. the school district invoked the 
impasse- resolution procedures set forth in CSL §209-3- Notwith-
standing its objections that it was not obliged to do so, the 
OOCi '< 
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association participated in these procedures. Prom its point of 
view, however, its objections reached a further dimension when 
the school district referred the impasse to its school board for 
a legislative determination. It was the issuance of the legis-' 
lative determination a few days later that precipitated the charge. 
The gravamen of the charge is that the contract did not 
provide for the invocation of impasse procedures when it pro-
v i l ! e i r ~ f o T " ~ n ^ g o ~ t T a T O — T h e - h e ariTrg—ofTrcTer"~ 
noted that impasse procedures had been invoked on April 30,.1973j 
which was more than four months prior to the filing of the charge. 
Accordingly, he dismissed the charge as not being timely.—'" 
In its objections, the association argues that although 
it was not. contractually obligated to submit to mediation or 
factfinding, its distress at the invocation of these procedures 
was only minimal because they are designed to assist the parties 
to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Its argument stresses 
the distinction between a legislative determination and the other 
impasse procedures set forth in CSL §209; only the legislative 
determination permits terms and conditions of employment to be 
imposed upon it and it was the attempt to impose terms and con-
ditions of empldyment through a legislative determination'' that ' 
was improper. It represents that its participation in the other 
procedures did not constitute a waiver of its right not to be 
subjected to a legislative determination and that it had no reason • 
to file £ charge until August 2, 1973-
We agree with this analysis of the charging party; thus we 
find the filing of the charge to have been timely. What is hot 
clear, however, is whether the contract providing that the 
dispute shall "become subject to negotiations under the Taylor 
Law" contemplated the invocation of all the Taylor Law procedures' 
including a legislative determination. The resolution .of this 
1 See §204.1 of our Rules, of Procedure. 
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question involves an interpretation of the contract between the 
parties. Such a question of contract interpretation should be 
resolved by the procedure that the parties have set up for such 
purpose — the grievance procedure. Accordingly, we defer to it. 
We determine that the hearing officer erred' in dismissing 
the charge as not having been timely filed and in not granting 
the associationrs~moWoiT~i£'or~~d e~ferraT~t~cr~arbl~t"ralrxowr—~Howevep-f^ ^— 
we retain jurisdiction of the matter and will entertain a motion 
to reopen the matter' upon a showing' that either (1) the dispute 
has not been resolved by the grievance procedure or submitted 
to arbitration with reasonable promptness, or (2.) if submitted 
to arbitration, the arbitrator's decision does not comply with 
the criteria set forth In the Matter of New York City Transit 
•Authority, 4 PERB 3669 (1971); 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the improper.practice charge 
herein should be and it hereby is conditionally 
dismissed in its entirety subject to a motion 
to reopen in the event that the dispute is riot 
resolved by the contract grievance procedure 
or that the arbitrator's decision (if any) does 
not comply with the criteria set forth In the 
Matter of New York City Transit Authority, 
• • ' , .H PERB 3669 (1971). 
Dated: New York,- New York 
May'23, 1974. 
Jo'sepH R. Crowley 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BO WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK I 2205 
BOARD MEMBERS JtlAK/O-l/-?/, 
April 23, 1974 m ' 3 / Z J / M ROBERT D. HELSBY 
CHAIRMAN 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY 
FRED L. DENSON 
MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD 
ITROMT"- PaulE. - Klein \/%$ 
SUBJECT: Subpoenas 
In November, 1973, the Board set forth the following general policy with 
regard to the issuance of subpoenas: 
"Subpoenas. Whenever a party is represented by a 
layman rather than by an attorney, the hearing 
officer shall be authorized to issue subpoenas 
and subpoenas duces tecum where the representative 
of the party could have done so had he been an 
attorney. The hearing officers will rely upon 
their own judgment in issuance of subpoenas and 
should not grant the request of the lay representa-
tive automatically. It is, however, intended that 
the hearing officer cooperate with the lay repre-
sentative and issue a subpoena if he determines 
that the evidence sought is likely to be material." 
Several questions now arise with regard to the proper interpretation of this 
policy: 
1. As you know, NYSUT is presently not using its attorneys in improper 
practice cases before us. Therefore, it is claiming the right to have us 
issue subpoenas ad testificandum on their behalf. Their reason, in many 
instances, for wanting such subpoenas is not to assure the presence of a 
potential witness (the witness quite often is an officer of NYSUT);rather, 
their reason is to assure that the witness will get a full day's pay pursuant 
to a clause in the collective bargaining agreement, 
I have taken the position that, although their house counsel is not formally 
litigating the case before us, their counsel is, nevertheless, available to 
issue subpoenas and should do so rather than us. I would like Board 
confirmation of this. 
2. The policy quoted above seems to indicate that, where PERB should 
legitimately issue a subpoena on behalf of a party that does not have the 
services of an attorney available to it, clearance is not necessary. I think 
this is appropriate; the hearing officer and I can exercise appropriate 
discretion. However, I would also like your thinking in this regard. 
cc - J.-. Lefkowitz 
